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KENTUCKY LAW JOUR1NAL
Domrsic RELATIONs-BED AN BoAm DiVOlCE iN KNucKy-The
opinion in the recent case of Coleman v. Coleman1 may shed some
light on the present attitude of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky con-
cerning the advisability of a bed and board divorce instead of an
absolute divorce. The plaintiff husband filed suit for divorce alleging
the statutory ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. The defendant
wife by counter-claim asked for divorce and alimony. The chancellor
declined to grant an absolute divorce to either party because proof
of any statutory ground was insufficient. He did grant a divorce from
bed and board and awarded the wife alimony in the amount of $850.00
per month.
The plaintiff was a wealthy fifty-eight year old physician and the
wife was forty-nine years of age. Each had been married once before.
The conflicting testimony given by both parties showed, if nothing else,
the utter hopelessness of reconciliation. There was ample evidence
that plaintiff was a man of placid manner and that defendant was of a
more mercurial temperament. There was no evidence, however, that
he was without fault. On cross-appeal the plaintiff contended that
the chancellor should have granted him an absolute divorce. The
wife insisted that the amount of alimony should be increased. The
Court of Appeals reversed with directions to the chancellor to grant
an absolute divorce to the husband and to make a suitable award of
alimony to the wife.
The appellate opinion stated that the chancellor had based his
conclusion that the husband was not entitled to an absolute divorce on
the line of Kentucky cases of which Purcell v. Purcell2 is typical. In
that case it was said that unless there is evidence of physical violence,
it is only persistent, studied and habitual 6onduct which will be
treated as "cruel and inhuman treatmenf' as those words are used in
the divorce statute.3 Justice Combs pointed out that this was not a
correct interpretation of the full meaning of the statute. He said that
the last part of subsection (d) of the statute is in the alternative.
That is, the cruel and inhuman treatment may be either such as to
indicate a settled aversion to him or to destroy permanently his peace
or happiness.4 It was the latter that was found by the appellate court
in the instant case. The court was undoubtedly sound in its decision.
1269 S.W. 2d 780 (1954).
2197 Ky. 627, 247 S.W. 760 (1923).
'Ky. BEv. STAT. see. 403.020(4) provides in part
"(4) A divorce may be granted to the husband for the following causes:
(d) Habitually behaving toward him, for not less than six months, in such
cruel and inhuman manner as to indicate a settled aversion to him or to destroy
permanently his peace or happiness; . .." (Emphasis supplied by writer.)
'Supra note 1.
RECENT CASES
It is to be noted that the opinion emphasized the fact that, although
the statutory requirement for a divorce based on cruelty to the wife
is that she be without like fault, there is no such limitation upon the
right of a husband who seeks a divorce on the ground of cruel and
inhuman treatment. The fact that the plaintiff here may or may not
have been guilty of the same misconduct should have had no bearing
on the chancellor's decision.
Under Kentucky's legal separation statute5 a divorce from bed and
board may be granted for any cause sufficient for an absolute divorce,
or for any other cause that the court in its discretion considers suf-
ficient. In the exercise of that discretion in this case, the chancellor
must have had reasonably sufficient grounds to believe that the mar-
riage could not be happy. He did what he thought was best under the
circumstances. His conclusion on the facts of the case was right but
his remedy was wrong.
A judicial separation or limited divorce is commonly called a bed
and board divorce in Kentucky. It does not dissolve the marriage bond
nor effect the property rights of the parties. In most instances mainte-
nance is provided but this depends upon the individual case.
The practice of resorting to the bed and board divorce as a cure-all
for an unhappy marriage has been long standing in the Kentucky
divorce courts, with affirmance by the appellate court.( There is a
possibility that many bed and board divorces were granted because
of the misinterpretation of the absolute divorce statute as evidenced
in the present case.
A bed and board divorce should be limited to the exceptional case
where it is the best possible solution.7 It might be that a judicial
separation would be best if there were religious beliefs of one or both
of the parties that a dissolvement of the marriage would be an offense
against God.
A limited divorce does not dissolve the marriage tie. It is a mere
legal separation. It does not grant either party the right to marry
again. It is no defense to a civil or criminal charge of adultery, either
between the parties themselves or with any other person. If children
are born they may be considered illegitimate. Mr. Justice Swift has
stated:
It places them [the parties] in a situation where there is an irresistible
temptation to the commission of adultery, unless they possess more
KY. REV. STAT. sec. 403.050.
'Nall v. Nail, 287 Ky. 855, 153 S.W. 2d 909 (1941); Ball v. Ball, 217 Ky.
337, 289 S.W. 259 (1926); Cecil v. Cecil, 200 Ky. 453, 255 S.W. 64 (1923);
Phillips v. Phillips, 173 Ky. 608, 191 S.W. 482 (1917); Zumbiel v. Zumbiel, 113
Ky. 841, 69 S.W. 708 (1902); Evans v. Evans, 93 Ky. 510, 20 S.W. 605 (1892).
7 Supra note 1.
KENTucKy LAw JouRNA.
frigidity, or more virtue than generally falls to the share of human
beings.8
Mr. Bishop says:
It is destitute of justice and one of the most corrupting devices ever
imposed by serious natures on blindness and credulity. It was toler-
ated only because men believed as a part of their religion that dis-
solution would be an offense against God, whence the slope was easy
towards any compromise with good sense, and as the fruits of com-
promise we have this ill-begotten monster.9
A typical statement of justification for the granting of a limited
divorce rather than an absolute divorce was stated by the court in
Nall v. Nail:
We have reached the conclusion, however, that the record before us
clearly indicates that appellant and appellee have become so estranged
as to render it impossible, or at least highly improbable, that a recon-
ciliation may be affected, or that they could hereafter live together
in peace and happiness.' 0
In Ball v. Ball the Court said:
We have concluded that they doubtless can not live together as hus-
band and wife in the peace and happiness that should attend such a
union.11
It is to be noted that in both cases the court had reached a definite
conclusion that there was nothing left to the marriage. No peace nor
happiness could attend it. There was no chance for a reconciliation.
Why, then, should the marriage not be absolutely dissolved? It is this
writer's contention that people should not be thrown back upon society
shackled with a marriage bond which prevents them from having
normal relations with society. By law both parties are now bound to
celibacy. Should the law erect a barrier such as this? Both parties are
prevented from obtaining that share of happiness which one or both
might find with someone else.
There is no feasible argument that the rights of both cannot be
protected by an absolute divorce. The opinion in the present case
points out that a limited divorce may give an innocent wife protection
from a cruel or drunken husband, but that the same result could be
obtained by divorce, alimony, and a restraining order and injunction.1
2
Divorce could and should be the beginning of a new life for each
party. A limited divorce leaves them dead to each other and a menace
to society.
L. M. TiPToN RE
8 KEEZE, MABr.AGE AD DIVORCE 306 (Morland's 3rd ed., 1946).
0Ibid.
'a Supra note 6, at 363,' 153 S.W. 2d at 914.
' Supra note 6, at 338, 289 S.W. at 259.
" Supra note 1.
